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Situation IV.
STEATEGIC AREA ON HIGH SEAS.
There is Avar between States X and Y. Other States
are neutral. A merchant vessel of the United States is
proceeding to a port of State Z and is 10 miles from any
land, though at that distance from the coast of State X.
A cruiser of State X approaches and warns the master
of the merchant vessel that he must keep farther off the
coast as this water is within the strategic area which has
been proclaimed by the Government of X and is closed
to all vessels.
The master appeals to the commander of a cruiser of
the United States to escort him through this area. The
voyage would not bring the vessels within 5 miles of the
coast of State X.
What should the commander do ?
SOLUTION.
The commander should decline to escort the merchant
vessel through the strategic area.
He should advise the master of the merchant vessel to
keep clear of the strategic area.
NOTES.
Opinion of Grotius.—Grotius very early advocated
some form of control by a fleet over the area which it
commanded. The words of Grotius are translated by
Whewell as follows:
The empire of a portion of the sea is, it would seem, acquired
in the same way as other lordship; that is, as above stated, as
belonging to a person, or as belonging to a territory : Belonging
to a person, when he has a fleet which commands that part of
the sea ; belonging to a territory, in so far as those who sail in
that part of the sea can be compelled from the shore as if they
were on land. (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, L. II, c. Ill, sec. 2.)
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Phillimore in a measure follows Grotius. He says
:
The portion of sea actually occupied by a fleet riding at anchor
is within the dominion of the nation to which the fleet belongs
so long as it remains there; that is, for all purposes of jurisdic-
tion over persons within the limits of the space so occupied. The
like principle is applicable to the portion of territory occupied
by an army, a fleet being considered as a maritime army.
This proposition is of course not to be considered without ref-
erence to the place of anchorage : A French fleet permitted to
anchor in the Downs, or an English fleet at Cherbourg, would
only have jurisdiction over the subjects of the respective countries
which happen to be within the limits of their temporary occupa-
tion of the water. Both in the case of the fleet and the army
there is, according to the theory of the law, a continuation or
prorogation of the territory to which they belong. (International
Law, CCIII.)
Area of war.—The area of hostilities is generally re-
garded as limited to the belligerent jurisdiction and the
open sea. On the open sea neutrals are liable to the
consequences if they enter a field in which belligerent
operations are at the moment going on, e. g., come into
range during an actual battle between the fleets of the
opposing belligerents. Otherwise, it has been generally
supposed that the high seas were free to innocent neutral
vessels in the time of war as in the time of peace, though
in the time of war neutral vessels might be liable to
visit and search.
Blockaded area,—One of the other restrictions upon
the movements of neutral vessels is imposed in the estab-
lishment of blockade. The area of operations of the
blockading force is under the provisions of the declara-
tion of London of 1909, regarded as closed to neutral
vessels under risk of seizure. It is not always possible
to define the limits of this area. Formerly the area was
not limited under American doctrine, but a seizure might
be made at any point outside of neutral jurisdiction if a
vessel were bound for a blockaded port. An attempt to
explain and make more definite the area was made at
the International Naval Conference in 1908-9.
Aeticle 17. 'Neutral vessels are not to he captured for breach
of blockade except within the area of operations of the ships 'of
war detailed to render the blockade effective.
116 Strategic Area on High Seas.
The other conditions of the liability of a vessel to capture is
that she be found within the radius of action of the warships
assigned to maintain the blockade effective; it is not enough that
she should be on her way to the blockaded port.
As for what constitutes the radius of action, an explanation
has been given which has been universally accepted, and which is
reproduced here as furnishing the best commentary on the rule of
article 17
:
" When a Government decides to undertake blockading opera-
tions against some part of the enemy coast it assigns a certain
number of warships to take part in the blockade, and intrusts
the command of these to an officer whose duty is to insure by
this means the effectiveness of the blockade. The commander
of the naval force thus formed distributes the ships placed at his
disposal according to the configuration of the coast and the geo-
graphical position of the blockaded places, and gives each ship
instructions as to the part which she has to play, and especially
as to the zone intrusted to her surveillance. It is all of the
zones of surveillance together, organized in such manner that the
blockade is effective, that form the radius of action of the blockad-
ing naval force.
"The radius of action so understood is closely connected with
the effectiveness of the blockade, and also with the number of
ships employed on it.
" Cases may occur in which a single ship will be enough vo
maintain a blockade effective—for instance, at the entrance of
a port, or at the mouth of a river with a small estuary—on con-
dition as circumstances allow the blockading ship to stay near
enough to the entrance. In that case the radius of action is
itself near the coast. But, on the contrary, if circumstances
force her to remain far off, it may be that one ship would not be
enough to secure effectiveness, and to maintain this it will then
be necessary to add other ships. From this cause the radius of
action becomes wider and more remote from the coast. It may
therefore vary with circumstances and with the number of
blockading ships, but it will always be limited by the condition
that effectiveness must be assured.
" It does not seem possible to assign limits to the radius of
action in definite and unvarying figures any more than it is pos-
sible to fix beforehand and invariably the number of ships neces-
sary to assure the effectiveness of any blockade. These points
must be determined according to circumstances in each particu-
lar case of a blockade; perhaps it would be possible to do this
at the time of the declaration.
" It is evident that a blockade will not be established in the
same way on a defenseless coast and on a coast possessing all
modern means of defense. There would be no question in the
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latter case of applying a rule such as that which formerly re-
quired that ships should be stationary and sufficiently close to
the blockaded places. The position would be too dangerous for
the ships of the blockading force, which besides now possess more
powerful means enabling them to watch effectively a much wider
zone than formerly.
" The radius of action of a blockading naval force may extend
somewhat far, but as it depends on the number of ships con-
tributing to the effectiveness of the blockade and is always lim-
ited by the condition of effectiveness, it will never reach remote
seas upon which merchant vessels sail which are perhaps des-
tined for the blockaded ports, but whose destination is contingent
on the changes which circumstances may produce in the blockade
during their voyage. To sum up, the idea of the radius of action
joined to that of effectiveness as we have tried to define it—that
is to say, including the zone of operations of the blockading
forces—allows the belligerent to exercise in an effective manner
the right of blockade which is admitted to be his, and, on the
other hand, it saves neutrals from exposure to the inconvenience
of blockade at a great distance, while it leaves them free to run
the risks to which they knowingly expose themselves by approach-
ing points to which access is forbidden by the belligerent."
(N. W. C. International Law Topics, 1909, pp. 49-53.)
The definition of the area of operations of a blockade
even if in such manner as to include a large range of
high sea is regarded as a legitimate act of war, and the
belligerent right is respected. The principle which is
recognized is that the belligerent has the right to put
pressure upon his opponent without interference by neu-
trals. It is undoubtedly an inconvenience and may be
a loss to neutral commerce to be excluded from the block-
aded area, but it is a recognized consequence of war.
Mined areas.—Warlike operations in recent years have
been extended through the use of new means of warfare.
The introduction of submarine mines as a means of war-
fare immediately gave rise to the question of the area
within which they might lawfully be used. The use of
mines during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5 gave
practical demonstration of the necessity of determining
the regulation of the use of mines. Dr. Lawrence, then
lecturer on international law at the British Royal Naval
College, writing in 1904, when the events of the Russo-
Japanese War were before the world, says
:
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A discussion on a moot point of neutral procedure when navi-
gating the high seas, leads naturally to a further discussion of
certain matters connected with belligerent procedure in the open
waters which are part of the common highway of all nations.
The question, or rather the group of questions, to which we refer
grew out of the sinking of the Japanese battleship Hatsuse by a
marine mine on May 15, when she was cruising 10 miles southeast
of Port Arthur, and therefore out on the high seas a considerable
distance beyond Russian territorial waters. A month before,
on April 13, a Russian battleship, the PetropavlovsJc, had been
destroyed by a Japanese mine or mines. But as the catastrophe
took place in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, and at no very
great distance from the shore, it was felt to be a legal, though
terrible, incident of warfare. No one disputes the right of belliger-
ents to lay mines in their own territorial waters or those of their
foes as a means of strengthening the defenses of harbors or assist-
ing attacks upon them. But when the area of destruction is ex-
tended to the high seas, questions of legality immediately arise.
The sinking of the Hatsuse was discussed at once by the press of
the civilized world. The general impression seems to have been
that the Russians created a mine field in the open sea, or deliber-
ately turned mechanical mines adrift in all the waters to which
they had access. Under the impression that these views were
correct, Russian methods were vehemently denounced and Russian
officers charged with a gross violation of international law. In
the United States the chorus of condemnation was especially
loud ; but the American Government wisely refrained from making
representations before it was sure of the facts and instructed its
naval attaches abroad to inquire into the matter.
After discussing the available information in regard to
the use of these mines, Lawrence says
:
We pass now from conjecture about fact to discussion about
law. Immediately we find ourselves face to face with a difficulty
which is serious in all legal systems, and specially serious in that
which is called international law. There are no precedents.
Mines are not new. They have been used on land since the intro-
duction of gunpowder. But the first to employ them successfully
at sea were the Confederates, who mined their harbors and blew
up several of the attacking or blockading ships. This was in the
American Civil War of 1861-1865 ; and since that time vast im-
provements have been introduced in the apparatus of submarine
defense. But though mining as an art has been revolutionized, the
practice of it has been confined to the ports and territorial waters
of belligerent powers. The recent case is the first in which a mine
acted far out at sea. How is an unprecedented situation to be
met in international law? (War and Neutrality in the Far East,
2d ed., pp. 93-100.)
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Prof. Holland in a letter to the Times May 23, 1904,
said
:
The question raised in your columns by Admiral de Horsey
with reference to facts as to which we are as yet imperfectly in-
formed well illustrates the perpetually recurring conflict between
belligerent and neutral interests. They are, of course, irrecon-
cilable, and the rights of the respective parties can be defined
only by way of compromise. It is beyond doubt that the theoreti-
cally absolute right of neutral ships, whether public or private,
to pursue their ordinary routes over the high seas in time of war
is limited by the right of the belligerents to fight on those seas a
naval battle, the scene of which can be approached by such ships
only at their proper risk and peril. In such a case the neutral
has ample warning of the danger to which he would be exposed
did he not alter his intended course. It would, however, be an
entirely different affair if he should find himself implicated in
belligerent war risks, of the existence of which it was impossible
for him to be informed, while pursuing his lawful business in
waters over which no nation pretends to exercise jurisdiction.
It is certain that no international usage sanctions the employ-
ment by one belligerent against the other of mines or other secret
contrivances which would, without notice, render dangerous the
navigation of the high seas. (Letters on War and Neutrality,
p. 131.
)
These expressions of opinion were in accord with the
ideas of the time, and it was natural that the subject of
regulation of the use of mines should come before the
Second Hague Conference of 1907.
That the danger to neutrals was very great is evident
from a declaration of the Chinese delegate at this con-
ference :
Le gouvernement chinois est encore aujourd'hui dans l'obliga-
tion de munir les vaisseaux de sa navigation cotiere d'instruments
speciaux pour repecher et detruire les mines flottantes qui encom-
brent non seulement la mer libre mais encore ses eaux terri-
toriales. Malgre toutes les precautions prises, un nombre tr§s
considerable de navires de cabotage, de bateaux de peche, de
jonques, et de sampans a sombre par suite de rencontres avec ces
mines automatiques sous-marines, et ces vaisseaux se sont perdus
corps et biens sans que les details de ces desastres soient parvenus
au monde occidental. II est calcule que de cinq a six cents de
uos nationaux qui vaguaient a leurs occupations pacifiques ont
ainsi trouve une mort cruelle par suite de ces engins dangereux.
(Deuxieine Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III,
p. 663.)
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The discussion at The Hague in 1907 was long con-
tinued and showed great differences of opinion. The
conclusions reached were not unanimous. The conven-
tion relative to the laying of automatic contact submarine
mines which was at length agreed upon at The Hague
covered the subject only in part. The area in which such
mines may be placed is not defined, though the belligerent
is " to notify the danger zone as soon as military exigencies
permit," and " every possible precaution must be taken
for the security of peaceful navigation." The prohibi-
tion of mines off the coast of the enemy " with the sole
object of intercepting commercial navigation " would
have little effect.
The Institute of International Law at Paris in 1910
proposed the following rule
:
Article 1. It is forbidden to place in the open sea automatic
contact mines whether or not anchored, the question of mines
controlled by electricity being reserved.
It is clear that, even though as shown by the vote of
the Institute of International Law in 1910, the opinion
seems to be drifting toward a limitation of the area
within which mines may be used, yet there is up to the
present no conventional limitation.
Straits in time of war.—There have been many con-
tentions for the maintenance by the coast state of suprem-
acy over straits. The Danish Sound was long regarded
as within the control of Denmark. The Baltic Sea was
by conventional agreement closed to hostilities by other
States than those bordering upon its waters. Great
Britain early in the nineteenth century denied that this
sea was closed to hostilities. The passage of the Bos-
phorus and Dardanelles has been subject to regulation,
and sometimes entirely closed. The question of using
submarine mines in straits was raised at the Second
Hague Conference. The Dutch delegate proposed "En
tous cas les detroits, qui unissent deux mers libres ne peu-
vent pas etre barres." (Deuxieme Conference de la Paix,
Tome III, p. 661.) After much discussion the com-
mittee decided to suppress provisions concerning straits
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with the distinct understanding that their status was not
affected by the convention relative to the laying of auto-
matic contact submarine mines.
This convention is fully recognized as only a first step.
The opinions of the delegations from some of the larger
States were far from harmonious. Great Britain, gen-
erally in favor of restriction, was not averse to extending
the mine field to a distance of 10 miles from the position
of guns on land.
News-gathering agencies.—Another attempt to extend
the area from which those not engaged in the hostilities
may be excluded appears in the attempt to regulate news-
gathering agencies. Correspondents were formerly taken
with military expeditions as a matter of course. The
dangers of such a course were not clearly evident till
shown in the Spanish-American War of 1898. At that
time the improved means of communication made it pos-
sible for the news of the movements of the forces, actual
or contemplated, to become public in such manner as
seriously to inconvenience those responsible for their suc-
cess. During the Kusso-Japanese War of 1901^5 the use
of wireless telegraphy greatly increased the facility with
which news could be sent from the area of operations or
from the neighborhood. A corresponding control of the
agencies for the diffusion of information is essential to
the success of belligerent operations. A consideration of
the physical possibilities, of the military necessities, and
of the rights of the belligerents and neutrals would seem
to support the conclusions of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law in 1906
:
Aet. 6. Sur la haute mer, dans la zone qui correspond h la
sphere d'action de leurs operations rnilitaires, les belligerants
peuvent empecher les emissions d'ondes, meme par une sujet
neutre. (21 Annuaire de l'lnstitut, p. 327.)
Such a rule as the above, demanded by the necessities
for effective conduct of the war, may bear heavily upon
a neutral in a special case, but that the war be conducted
effectively and be brought to a speedy close would be for
the general advantage, and the conditions conducing to
that end should prevail.
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Japanese ordinance, 1904.—In accord with Imperial
Ordinance No. 11, promulgated January 23, 1904, the
Japanese minister of the navy, or in case of necessity a
subordinate official, might designate a " defense sea area * 7
or " strategical area " from which vessels might be ex-
cluded, even by force of arms, or within which the move-
ments of vessels might be regulated.
Imperial Ordinance No. 11, 1904.
[Promulgated Jan. 23, 1904.]
ORDINANCE REGARDING DEFENSE SEA AREAS.
Article 1. In case of war or emergency, the minister of the
navy may, limiting an area, designate a defense sea area under
this ordinance. The designation, or revocation, of such defense
sea area shall be advertised by the minister of the navy.
Art. 2. In case of urgent necessity, the commander in chief
of a naval station, or the commandant of a secondary naval sta-
tion, may make the designation mentioned in the preceding article.
In this case the designation or its revocation shall be advertised
by the commander in chief or the commandant.
Art. 3. In the defense sea area, the ingress and egress and pas-
sage of any vessels other than those belonging to the army or
navy are prohibited from sunset to sunrise.
Art. 4. Within the limits of naval and secondary naval ports
included in a defense sea area the ingress and egress and passage
of all vessels other than those belonging to the army or navy
are prohibited.
Art. 5. All vessels which enter, leave, pass through, or anchor
in a defense sea area shall obey the direction of the commander
in chief of the naval station, or the commandant of the secondary
naval station, concerned.
Art. 6. The commander in chief of a naval station, or the com-
mandant of a secondary naval station, may, when he thinks neces-
sary, forbid or limit within a defense sea area fishing, taking of
seaweeds, or any other act considered to interfere with military
operations.
Art. 7. The commander in chief of a naval station, or the com-
mandant of a secondary naval station, may absolve vessels, which
he thinks fit, from the whole or a part of the prohibitions or
limitations mentioned in this ordinance.
Art. 8. Any vessel which has transgressed this ordinance, or
orders issued under this ordinance, may be ordered to leave the
defense sea area by a route which shall be designated.
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Regarding vessels which do not obey the order mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, armed force may be used when
necessary.
Art. 9. The master of a vessel, or a person acting as such,
which has violated any rules of articles 3 to 5, inclusive, will be
punished with confinement at hard labor for not more than one
year, or with a fine of not more than yen 200.
Art. 10. Persons who have violated the prohibition or limita-
tion of article 6 will be punished with confinement at hard labor
for not more than six months, or with a fine of not more than
yen 100.
SUPPLEMENTARY RULE.
This ordinance takes effect from the date of promulgation.
Regulations, Japenese strategical areas, 1901^—5.—The
regulations governing movements of vessels within
" strategical areas " varied according to the area which
was under the regulation. The notification of the estab-
lishment of these areas was made in the Official Ga-
zette. Twelve or more of such areas were established;
about bays, as at Tokyo; about islands, as the Pescadores;
in the neighborhood of naval stations, as Sasebo; or
covering straits, as Taugaru Straits.
The minister of the United States to Japan forwarded
the following on January 13, 1905, to the Secretary of
State
:
,No. 168. American Legation,
Tokyo, January 13, 19G5.
Sir : I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of a transla-
tion of the notification issued by the commander of the naval
station at Mokyu, in the Pescadores, relative to navigation through
the defensive sea area at Kelung.
This notification was promulgated in the Formosan Official
Gazette the 24th ultimo and has just reached this legation from
the consulate at Daitotei.
I have, etc.,
Lloyd Griscom.
INSTRUCTIONS TO VESSELS TRAVERSING THE DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AT
KELUNG.
The commander of the naval station at Mokyu (Pescadores) has
issued the following instructions to vessels traversing the de-
fensive sea area at Kelung.
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Article 1. Matters relating to the defensive sea area at Kelung
are under the direction of the commander of the temporary
Kelung submarine detachment.
Art. 2. Vessels other than those employed in the Government
service or the regular mail steamers wishing to traverse the de-
fensive sea area must first obtain permission from the commander
of the temporary Kelung submarine detachment.
Art. 3. Vessels not in the service of the army or navy before
passing or traversing the defensive sea area between the hours of
sunset and sunrise must obtain permission from the commander
of the temporary Kelung submarine detachment.
Art. 4. While passing through the defensive sea area vessels
must not exceed a speed of 5 nautical miles per hour.
Art. 5. Excepting in the districts in which permission has beeu
given by the commander of the temporary Kelung submarine de-
tachment, fishing is prohibited within the defensive sea area.
Art. 6. In case it is deemed necessary the commander of the
temporary Kelung submarine detachment may designate the
anchorage for vessels or may limit or prohibit their passage or
mooring for a time.
The rules governing the areas are shown by the fol-
lowing statements in regard to different areas
:
[Inclosure 3—Translation.]
RULES TO BE OBSERVED BY VESSELS PASSING THE TOKYO BAY, HAKO-
DATE, AND OTARTJ STRATEGICAL SEA AREAS—'TOKYO BAY.
[Issued by the commander in chief of the Yokosuka naval station.]
Article 1. Vessels passing in or out of Tokyo Bay shall stop
their course before they arrive, the former at the line connecting
Chiyo-ga-saki on the south side of Uraga Harbor and Kokubo-
hana of Awa Province, and the latter at the line connecting Natsu-
Shinia and the sea fort No. 2, and shall signal their names, make
the following signals, and wait the arrival of the guide boat
:
1. Steamers shall hoist the signal " want pilot," and at the same
time shall repeat whistles. <
2. Sailing vessels shall hoist the signal " want pilot " and blow
signal horn.
Art. 2. In response to the above signals the guide boat shall
hoist the "response" flag of the international signal code.
When any vessel is to be allowed freedom of movement the
guide boat shall haul down the " response " flag.
Art. 3. The guide boat shall carry at its masthead the pilot
flag (white upper, red lower) of the special signals to be used
for British vessels as mentioned in the international signal code.
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Art. 4. In passing through the area vessels shall not proceed at
a speed of more than 5 knots.
Art. 5. No vessels are allowed to cast anchor in any part of
the area, except in Uraga Harbor.
Art. 6. Fishing and the taking of sea weeds within the area are
prohibited.
Art. 7. When necessary, passage of vessels may for a time be
prohibited within the area.
Art. 8. Vessels of less than 20 tons gross or less than 200
" koku," or boats or other craft solely or mainly propelled by
oars, may traverse the area without observing the provisions of
article 1, subject to such restriction as may at any time be
necessary.
Art. 9. Vessels passing the area at night in violation of article
7, shall do so at the risk of being tired upon by torpedo boats or
patrol boats.
N. B.—The regulations for the strategical sea areas of Hako-
date and of Otaru are practically the same- as above.
[In closure 4.—Translation.]
RULES GOVERNING THE STRATEGICAL AREA AT NAGASAKI.
[Issued by the commander in chief of Sasebo.]
Article 1. Vessels which pass in, out of, or anchor in the
strategical sea area shall first stop at one of the two places men-
tioned below, and shall receive from the guard vessel stationed
for the purpose directions concerning their movements, beacons,
and signals, etc.
This rule shall not apply to vessels belonging to persons liv-
ing on the coast of the sea area.
Art. 2. The places where vessels are required to stop are
:
1. When entering the harbor, 1 mile north of Io-jima light-
house.
2. When leaving the harbor, one-half mile east of Takahoko-
jima.
Art. 3. The guard vessel shall be stationed near the two above-
mentioned places, and shall carry at its masthead the national
flag by day and two white lights abreast at night.
Art. 4. The guide boat which shall pilot vessels passing the
area shall carry at its masthead the pilot flag (white upper, red
lower) of special signals to be used for British vessels as given
in the international signal code.
Art. 5. Fishing and the taking of seaweeds within the area are
forbidden, except with the permission of the commander in chief
of the naval station.
Art. 6. The sea area is under the charge of the commanding
officer of the Nagasaki mining corps.
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[Inclosure 5.—Translation.]
RULES GOVERNING THE KI-TAN STRAIT SEA AREA AT KOBE.
Article 1. Vessels passing the Ki-Tan Strait strategical sea
area shall hoist the national flag and signal their names given
in the list of merchant marine, and. at night shall carry lights,
as required by the rules of the road.
Art. 2. Vessels other than those belonging to the navy or army
and those that have obtained permission in accordance with these
regulations are prohibited from passing the area.
Art. 3. Vessels passing the area shall stop at the examination
station, and after examination and inspection by the guard vessel,
shall proceed, hoisting the signal required.
Art. 4. When it is deemed unnecessary to examine any vessel,
and she is to be allowed freedom of movement, the guard vessel
will signal the fact by hoisting the " answering " and "A" signal
of the international code, and at night by showing one blue light.
Art. 5. Sailing vessels of less than 20 tons, gross, or of less
than 200 " koku," and other craft principally or solely propelled
by oars need not stop at the examining station unless ordered to
do so.
Art. 6. Small vessels mentioned in the preceding article may
fish within the area by day ; but the guard vessel may prohibit
them when necessary.
Art. 7. Vessels passing the area shall stop during rain or mist,
when the landmarks can not be seen, until weather clears.
Art. 8. Vessels permitted to pass Ki-Tan Straits between sun-
set and sunrise must take the channel between Awaji and Oki-
no-Shima.
Art. 9. Vessels which are compelled to pass the area at night
shall apply to the commander in chief of the Kure naval station
for a permit, stating the reason, certified by the local authorities.
Art. 10. The examination station is about 5 miles south of the
Oki-no-Shima Lighthouse.
In several areas the boundaries seem to have run out-
side the 3-mile limit and even 1.0 miles from land seems
to have been included in some instances. The straits
connecting open seas were also included. It is generally
held that straits connecting open seas are not to be
blockaded.
Case in Russo-Japanese War.—The entrance of a ves-
sel flying the French flag, the Quang-nam, to the " pro-
tected sea area " about the Pescadores Islands during the
Eusso-Japanese War in 1905 gave rise to a reference to
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that " area." The main statement of the attorney for the
petitioner was:
The steamship Quang-nam, being the property of the China
Coast Voyage Co., located at Paris, France, runs between Saigon,
Manila, Philippine Islands, Iloilo, and Cebu. According to a
charter entered into between the petitioners and the above com-
pany for the use of this ship in the transportation of goods she
was loaded at Saigon in the fourth month of 1905 with a cargo
consisting of cases of spirits and proceeded to Kamranh Bay,
where she delivered her cargo. On her voyage from Kamranh
Bay to Manila by way of Hongkong and Shanghai her engine was
damaged, so she steamed into the Pescadore Channel with the
object of finding harbor or some other ship to get assistance
for repairs. She was, however, captured by the Japanese man-
of-war on the 16th of the fifth month in the above channel. This
ship is a neutral ship, and both the petitioners and the charterers
are neutral subjects. Besides 130 tons of coal loaded at Shanghai
she took on board no contraband person or goods or letter, and
the master and others did not know that the vicinity of the
Pescadore Islands was the zone over which the " protected sea
area " had been proclaimed. Hence, this ship should not have
been captured. The written opinion of the public procurator
shows that he regarded this ship as employed by the Russian
Government and reconnoitering the defenses of Japan and the
movements of the Japanese fleet on behalf of the enemy. * * *
The main points of the opinion of the public procurator are
:
The charter party procured by the petitioners being a private
document which might be prepared at any time can not be
trusted. Consequently the petitioners are not parties entitled to
bring this action; therefore this petition should be rejected. On
the other hand, it may be inferred that this ship was chartered
by the Russian Government and was engaged in reconnoitering
the defenses of Japan and the movements of the Japanese fleet
for the benefit of the enemy. Hence she is liable to confiscation.
After reviewing and considering the evidence the court
concludes as to the Quang-nam:
That she purposely took a difficult passage between Formosa
and the Pescadores under the pretext of going to Manila, and
ran into Hatto Channel, was evidently for the purpose of recon-
noitering the defenses near those islands, and the movements of
the Japanese Squadron. Moreover, the fact that she took on
board, at Saigon, Cardiff coal which she never .before consumed,
that she sailed from Kamranh Bay to Shanghai by way of Hong-
kong without any cargo, and that, at Shanghai no cargo was
loaded, but 130 tons of Cardiff coal were taken on board when
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she had more than sufficient coal for her trip to Manila ; all these
facts must be regarded as means taken in order to accomplish
the service of reconnoitering. When a ship, though neutral, has
er.gaged in reconnoitering defenses and the movements of a
squadron for the benefit of the enemy, as this ship did, her con-
fiscation is allowed by International Law. For the above reasons
this ship should be confiscated. (Takahashi. International Law
Russo-Japanese War, pp. 736-738.)
The case was carried to the higher prize court, and
the judgment was sustained on the same grounds. Taka-
hashi regards this case as under the category of unneutral
service. The court considers that the vessel ran into
Hatto Channel " evidently for the purpose of recon-
noitering the defenses near those islands, and the move-
ments of the Japanese Squadron." The court said that
reconnoitering of this character is just ground for con-
fiscation.
As the area about the Pescadores Islands was a " stra-
tegical area " or a " defense sea area " the presence of the
ship within the area seemed to be a circumstance that
weighed against its release and an evidence of unneutral
service.
Resume.—The practice, nature of regulations, and
drift of opinion seem to show that in time of war a
belligerent is entitled to take measures for his protection
which are not unreasonable. Certainly he is entitled to
regulate the use of his territorial waters in such fashion
as shall be necessary for his well-being. Similarly a
belligerent may be obliged to assume in time of war for
his own protection a measure of control over the waters
which in time of peace would be outside of his jurisdic-
tion. It is universally admitted that if a neutral vessel
is carrying contraband to his opponent, a belligerent
may take the vessel to a prize court for adjudication.
For such an act the course of the vessel may be changed,
and it may be subjected to long delay. Would it be
reasonable to contend that the course of a vessel may be
changed to keep it out of a specified area because it
might there obtain information which would be of vastly
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greater importance to the enemy than a cargo of contra-
band, however noxious that might be.
SOLUTION.
The commander should decline to escort the merchant
vessel through the strategic area.
He should advise the master of the merchant vessel to
keep clear of the strategic area.
60252—12 9
